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Abstract This paper explores the rarely researched areas of co-offending and bribery. Based upon 
interviews with six persons convicted of bribery-related offences and other cases in the public 
domain, the paper explores how previously ‘clean’ persons are recruited to corrupt schemes. In 
doing so, the paper draws on Reason’s resident pathogen theory on safety and uniquely applies it to 
bribery. The paper also identifies common recruitment techniques used by corruptors and proposes 
pathogen network analysis as a novel method for enhancing bribery prevention.   
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Introduction 
Academic research into corruption has for decades skirted around a fundamental question: how is a 
corrupt relationship initiated? How does the corruptor secure the co-operation of the other party 
without triggering disastrous repercussions such as a complaint to the police? How do they 
determine if the other party is corrupt or is potentially corrupt? This challenge was illustrated in one 
of the first convictions under the UK Bribery Act 2010, when a University of Bath student was jailed 
for trying to bribe his professor (BBC, 2013). Yang Li had received a fail mark for his Master’s degree 
dissertation and arranged a meeting with Professor Graves. Li arrived at the meeting armed with a 
pistol and placed £5,000 in cash on the professor’s desk, declaring “I am a businessman…you can 
keep the money if you give me a pass mark and I won’t bother you again.” Li’s attempt failed, he was 
reported to the authorities and ended up in jail. Such exposures and prosecutions are rare, but the 
evidence suggests that bribery is a far more significant problem than the detected figures suggest 
(OECD, 2014). This implies that many corruptors are successful in luring others into their schemes 
and only a few fail as spectacularly as Mr Li. This paper seeks to explore the recruitment of persons 
into corruption. The article is not concerned with fleeting corrupt relationships such as when a police 
officer demands a payment to avoid issuing a penalty ticket. The research focuses on more enduring 
or substantive relationships. The paper builds upon Reason’s (2000b) resident pathogen theory to 
explain the conditions necessary for bribery to occur and then, drawing upon the interviews from 
this research and other information in the public domain, explore how people are recruited into 
corrupt schemes. It does not, however, explore why people become corrupt (for those interested in 
this see Schoepfer et al, 2014; Gottschalk, 2017). The paper introduces the pathogen network as a 
novel method for researchers and practitioners to visually analyse corrupt or potentially corrupt 
situations. Firstly, however, the paper sets out the context of bribery and outlines the research 
methods. 
 
Bribery and corruption in context   
The precise scale of bribery is unknown due to undetected and unreported cases, but has been 
estimated at $1 trillion paid annually worldwide (Gottschalk and Tcherni-Buzzeo, 2017; OECD, 2014). 
A European Commission study estimated that 1 in 5 public procurement contracts are corrupt and 
the average loss to corruption is 3.65% (EC, 2013). More than two-thirds of countries score below 50 
on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index; the UK is in 8th place with a score of 
82 (Transparency International, 2018). The corrosive extent of the problem has energised the 
campaigns of transnational organisations, including Transparency International, the Organisation for 
Economic Development and the United Nations. Many countries have responded to these entreaties 
by enacting anti-bribery legislation (Gordon and Miyake, 2000). The UK government unified previous 
legislation with the introduction of the Bribery Act 2010. 
 
There is a corpus of scholarly work which addresses the broad field of white-collar crime and fraud, 
starting with the seminal research of Sutherland (1940) and Cressey (1953), see Van Slyke et al 
(2016) for a general introduction. There is also a reasonable body of research drawn from several 
academic disciplines which explores the narrower issue of corruption and anti-corruption policies 
(Brytting et al, 2011; Eicher, 2012; Kubbe and Engelbert, 2018). There is, however, very little 
research into why and how individuals engage in corruption (Mazar et al, 2015; Welsh et al, 2015). 
Research which specifically addresses bribery is rare. Köbis et al (2016) used psychological 
experiments to explore the propensity to bribe. Hernandez and McGee (2013) highlighted significant 
cultural variations in the public tolerance of bribery. Goldstraw-White and Gill (2016) have explored 
how organisations in the Middle East cope with the risk of Bribery. Lord (2014) has focused on 
transnational bribery and law enforcement. Lord and Levi (2016) explored how the situational crime 
prevention approach could be deployed to frustrate the financing of corporate bribery. The authors 
are not aware of any research based on interviews with convicted bribe payers and takers other 
than Gray (2013), who drew upon five publicly broadcast interviews with Jack Abramoff, a 
prominent political lobbyist, convicted for multiple acts of fraud and corruption. 
 
A distinguishing feature of bribery is that it always involves co-offending between the bribe payer 
and the bribe receiver. Often these conspiratorial relationships are uncomplicated and fleeting, 
particularly in countries where petty corruption is endemic: a small sum of money or other benefit is 
paid to gain preferential treatment in, for example, expediting bureaucracy, smuggling, seeking 
favourable regulatory decisions or to win contracts (Fletcher and Hermann, 2012; Graycar and 
Sidebottom, 2012). The first conviction under the Bribery Act 2010 in the UK involved short-term, 
transactional relationships with traffic offenders: Munir Patel was a court clerk who received £500 a 
time bribes to refrain from recording court summonses into the judicial database (BBC, 2011). 
However, many relationships are more considered, complex, enduring and sometimes complicated 
by the involvement of occupational fraud, for example, Siemens (US Department of Justice, 2008) 
and the Crown employee, Ronald Harper (CPS, 2016). In these cases the supplier negotiates the 
value of the inducement and then conspires with the customer’s representative to fraudulently 
inflate the value of contracts in order to fund the bribe (United Nations, 2013, p25; Graycar and 
Prenzler, 2013, p101). 
 
There is little research literature which examines how these co-offending, corrupt relationships 
arise, whether fleeting or persistent. As van Mastrigt and Farrington (2009, p552) note, ‘…relatively 
few studies of co-offending exist, and the majority have been limited to examining juvenile samples.’ 
Sub-cultural theories, most notably differential association, promulgate explanations of the 
pathways to crime based on social learning in environments with degraded normative values 
(Ashforth and Annand, 2003; Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1992, p88). Similarly, Ditton (1977) 
and Mars (1982) found that corrupted organisational cultures and toxic associations encourage 
fraudulent behaviour in organisations. Free and Murphy (2015) highlighted the salience of social 
bonds in the aetiology of fraud conspiracies. 
 
Seeking inspiration from alternative scholarly silos which explore failures of organisational 
governance, there is a rich body of research dealing with safety, accidents, disasters, systems and 
human errors in decision-making (Perrow, 2011; Reason, 2000b; Toft and Reynolds, 1997). The 
literature suggests failures in organisational systems resulting from the fallibility of technical and 
human elements are inevitable, particularly when they converge. Reason (2000b) describes such 
unseen, lurking dangers as ‘resident pathogens’. These latent dangers could include poor design, 
faulty technology, inadequate management systems and poorly trained staff. In isolation, such 
resident pathogens may cause no problems, but in combination they may lead to a disaster. Using a 
sliced Swiss cheese metaphor, Reason (2000a, p769), illustrates these latent conditions as holes in 
an organisation’s defences and safety failures occur when the holes in the slices align to permit “a 
trajectory of accident opportunity”. The security analogies between safety and workplace crime 
suggest that the pathogen concept has utility in analysing bribery and other white-collar crimes. It 
does, however, require a significant additional ingredient, the human pathogen. In addition to the 
resident pathogens which fail to prevent bribery, there also needs to be at least one person who 
deliberately initiates the bribery and at least one other who agrees to participate.  
 
The proposition is that offending occurs when pathogens converge in time and place and are 
sufficiently stimulated. One can infer from Cressey’s (1953) fraud triangle that occupational fraud 
will occur when two pathogens coincide: inadequate security governance providing an opportunity 
and a financially distressed, psychologically prepared individual seeking a solution to his or her woes. 
The fraud diamond model (Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004) suggests a third pathogen: the presence of 
a capable, coercive offender. This paper builds on Reason’s safety ideas to analyse the co-offending 
offence of bribery building upon the pathogen concept. Before these ideas are explored in more 
depth the methods used for this research will be first considered.  
 
Methods  
This research is based upon interviews conducted in 2014 with offenders convicted of bribery 
offences in six unrelated cases. Three of the participants were commercial bribe payers and three 
were public officers who received or were expecting bribes. Online searches of media outlets, 
regulators and commercial people tracing tools identified 165 fraud and bribery offenders convicted 
between 2004 and 2013. Invitation letters were sent to all the 165 offenders. The approach secured 
13 positive responses and a further four through their social networks. Eleven were fraudsters and 
six were involved in bribery. The relevant details of the six bribery participants (from six separate 
cases) are set out in Table 1. Although six is a small sample, Gray (2013) demonstrated that 
examining the insider account of a single individual is sufficient to generate constructive insights. 
The majority of studies based on interviews with white-collar offenders have recruited and accessed 
participants in prison or under the auspices of probation services (Benson, 1990; Benson and Cullen, 
1988; Cressey, 1953; Goldstraw-White, 2012). The risk associated with this approach is the potential 
influence of a form of on-stage effect (Kalof et al, 2008, p159) in that the offender is motivated to 
impress the officialdom and may ‘…obscure the truth of their crime in order to gain favours’ (Copes 
and Hochstetler, 2010, p52), although this is not to suggest those outside prison may wish to 
impress, it is just the pressure to do so is less. There is also a real practical problem in recruiting 
research participants in prison or probation: in 2015 in the UK just two prosecutions were brought 
for bribery and 49 for misconduct in public office, a charge more often used for corrupt public 
officials (MoJ, 2016). The participants in the present research were all interviewed after their release 
from prison and supervision by the probation services. Two of the offenders, Carl and Carole, were 
prison employees and had been charged with misconduct in public office. The paper also draws 
upon data from publicly reported cases of bribe payers and takers. 
Although the statistically small number of participants limits the extent to which the results can be 
generalized, they do offer an insight into how those relationships are formed. The small sample size 
has also narrowed the types of bribery situations and actors. The research excludes, for example, 
fleeting petty corruption relationships and high level political corruption. It also excludes the 
important role of intermediary facilitators. Finally, though the methods sought to escape any 
influence of the penal institutions, the risk remained that participants chose to obscure some 
aspects of their roles in their proven crimes. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
A Typology of Bribery   
Describing bribery is simple: person A (or persons) gives person B (or persons) money or some other 
form of value to secure a gain from the improper performance of person B. For example, a speeding 
motorist gives a police officer £50 (gain) to not issue a speeding ticket, or a salesmen gives a buyer 
£1,000 (gain) to win a contract. However, defining the boundaries of the offence is not always so 
straightforward because it intersects with fraud, extortion and clientelism (Transparency 
International, u.d.). Understanding bribery is also fraught with the difficulties of identifying who is to 
blame, who is the beneficiary, who is the victim and what their respective roles are. The problem is 
further compounded in the international context by legal and cultural variations (Melgar et al, 2010). 
The reformative efforts of transnational organisations focus on controlling the active bribery 
perpetrated by international corporations (Eicher, 2012, p15), thus diminishing the role of the bribe 
takers. White-collar criminologists similarly tend to avert their attention from those who demand 
favours and focus on the criminogenic nature of capitalist corporations (Coleman, 1992). This 
emphasis on the egregiousness of the briber rather than the bribee may explain why bribe paying is 
often labelled ‘active bribery’ and bribe receiving is labelled ‘passive bribery’ (OECD, 2011). 
Confusingly, Burke (2010, p17) uses the same labels in a completely different way: he describes 
‘active bribery’ as bribery to obtain favourable outcomes, for example to win contracts, and ‘passive 
bribery’ as corrupt payments to avoid unfavourable outcomes, for example sanctions or 
punishment. Eicher (2012) differentiated between public corruption, for example bribing a public 
officer, and private corruption, such as when a company manager breaches his duties to arrange a 
bribe for his personal gain. 
This typological confusion, lack of research and the inexperience of some judiciaries is bound to 
contribute to the cultural and legal variations and lead to perplexing, inequitable outcomes. The 
German authorities jailed Gerhard Gribkowsky for 8½ years for accepting bribes from Bernie 
Ecclestone, the CEO of F1, but Ecclestone avoided conviction whilst admitting paying $44 million to 
prevent exposure of his dubious tax affairs (Le Blond, 2014). The participants’ cases in the present 
research followed a similar pattern. Brian, Harvey and Phil were convicted of paying bribes but their 
counterpart recipients escaped prosecution; the three public officials were convicted, but the 
bribers escaped sanction. The typological framework set out below resolved this confusion to bring 
clarity to the research analysis. 
 Briber – a person who pays a bribe 
o Assertive briber – a person who makes the first approach by offering a bribe 
o Submissive briber – a person who submits to a demand for a bribe from an assertive 
bribee 
 Bribee – a person who receives a bribe 
o Assertive bribee – a person who makes the first approach by demanding a bribe 
o Submissive bribee – a person who agrees to the offer of a bribe from an assertive 
briber 
 Facilitator – a person who facilitates the bribe and is independent of the briber and the 
bribee 
 Public bribery – paying bribes to public officials for bureaucratic, regulatory or commercial 
contract purposes 
 Commercial bribery – business to business bribery 
 
Metaphor of pathogens 
The metaphor of pathogens suggested by Reason (2000b) is an interactionist idea which recognises 
the social context of the organisation. It highlights the potential for safety failures arising from the 
structures, practices, norms and scripts embedded in the organisation’s culture and systems of self-
control. The notion is equally applicable to other areas of organisational practices, such as quality, 
environmental control, bribery and corruption. Referencing the typology previously set out, we can 
define three types of bribery pathogens. For a bribe to occur there must be a convergence of at least 
three pathogens and at least two types. There must be a human ‘corruptor pathogen’, a ‘resident 
pathogen’ within the organisational systems and the third pathogen must be either a ‘submissive 
pathogen’ or a second ‘corruptor pathogen’. 
Corruptor pathogen 
The corruptor pathogen is the predatory parasite who initiates the corrupt relationship, whether an 
assertive briber or an assertive bribee. It may be a person seeking private gains or to benefit others, 
their company or community. An example is a company manager who bribes a buyer to secure a 
contract. In the reverse case, a corruptor bribee pathogen is the manager who demands a bribe for 
awarding a contract. A more extreme instance involves the abuse of power and extortion: knowing 
that the supplier’s business is dependent on the relationship, the corruptor bribe threatens to cut off 
the supply arrangement unless a bribe is paid.  
Submissive pathogen 
The submissive pathogen, whether the briber or the bribee, is the person who is sufficiently 
motivated to submit to the solicitation of the corruptor pathogen. Again, the submissive pathogen 
may be a person seeking private gain or for others. It may be a bribee motivated by the lure of easy 
money, or an individual who is offered respite from personal financial strains, or a victim of 
extortion. It is also the businessman who rationally calculates that he has, for the sake of his 
business, no alternative and consents to corrupt demands. 
Resident pathogen 
Resident pathogens are the weaknesses lurking in organisational structures, policies, norms, systems 
of control and routine activities. They are implicit in the opportunity limb of Cressey’s (1953) fraud 
model: the shortcomings exploited by both bribers and bribees using their insider knowledge and 
expertise. Common examples are inadequate vendor appraisals, ineffective recruitment screening, 
superficial control of transactions and self-authorisation of expenditure (Tunley et al, 2018). 
Resident pathogens are not restricted to the systems of oversight, they also include factors which 
promote criminal acts, for instance, undue performance pressures and perverse incentives (MoJ, 
2011). In more extreme circumstances, bribery is so deeply embedded in an organisation’s cultural 
norms that the system is not just infected by pathogens, the entire system can be regarded as the 
resident pathogen. 
The corruption pathogen model 
Despite its limits (Schuchter and Levi, 2013; Wolfe and Hermanson, 2004), the fraud triangle 
paradigm is enduring partly due to its heuristic simplicity and because it lends itself to graphical 
presentation. The pathogen model extends this simple approach using social network techniques.  
Vicsek et al (2016) provide a brief overview of social network methods, including approaches which 
incorporate cultural aspects, concepts, categories and narratives as network nodes (see also Carley, 
1997). Whilst there is some precedence in applying network techniques to corruption (Nash et al, 
2017; Peoples and Sutton, 2015), a formal, yet flexible, visualisation framework is unique.  
Figure 1 sets out a model network for the classic contractual corruption, where the nodes represent 
an external assertive briber (C) who corrupts a customer’s employee (S) by exploiting the 
organisation’s resident pathogens (R). The submissive pathogen is co-located with the resident 
pathogens inside the organisation’s boundary, whilst the corruptor pathogen sits outside. In 
circumstances where the corruptor pathogen is an assertive bribee within the customer 
organisation, the positions of the corruptor and submissive pathogen labels are exchanged. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The same approach can be used to map the pathogen links within an organisation. Figure 2 draws on 
the experience of the prison officer, Carl, from this study to illustrate the situational pathway to 
crime: a cocktail of resident pathogens (R), coercive internal and external corruptor pathogens (C-I 
and C-E) and Carl, the submissive internal pathogen (S). The resident pathogens (R) are scaled in the 
figure to represent their assumed relative salience to the defensive vulnerabilities of the prison. 
 
Figure 2 about here  
 
The pathogen network can be as extended and complex as the analysis requires to understand the 
interactions between the actors and the systems, environments, routine activities, rules, norms and 
shared rationalisations. It can be configured according to the requirements of the selected unit of 
analysis. At the person level, the technique can be used to examine the pathogenic relationships 
between employees, systems, situations and external agents. Although this article has not explored 
the role of facilitators, whether intermediaries or professional advisors (Middleton and Levi, 2015), 
they can easily be incorporated. It can assist in visualising how the convergence of pathogens creates 
a contagion which infects a corporate entity. At the organisational level, the method supports the 
examination of relationships between organisations, marketplaces and regulators. With careful 
application, the model has the capacity to further our understanding of the pathology of 
organisations (Slapper and Tombs, 1999, p110). 
Having introduced the pathogen concept, this paper will now examine the proximal pathways to the 
act of bribery, the insidious circumstances, dialogue and scripts which precede the agreement to co-
offend. The analysis employs the pathogen metaphor to examine the crime situations using insights 
from the research interviews and cases in the public domain. The discussion primarily focuses on the 
social interactions which enable corruptors to recruit participants into their illegal conspiracies. 
 
Recruiting a submissive or other corruptor pathogen 
The first stage for the corruptor pathogen is to identify the potential target to corrupt. This is usually 
straightforward, though may be more difficult in complex procurements involving multiple actors. 
However, once a corruptor has identified the relevant decision-maker and important influencer, he 
is typically unsure whether the target can be corrupted, whether an approach would preclude him 
from bidding for the contract, or even that he might be reported to the relevant authorities. The 
more significant challenge is to then determine if the person can be turned (a latent submissive 
pathogen) or already is corrupt (a previously activated submissive or corruptor pathogen). The 
research has identified a number of strategies used by corruptor pathogens.  
Profiling a target 
In the Li case discussed earlier there was just one potential submissive pathogen, Li’s professor, and 
Li made a poor assessment which led to serious consequences. However, corruptors are often 
presented with a choice of targets. Agents of illegal gambling gangs have a choice of thousands of 
sportsmen and women. English cricketer Mervyn Westfield was successfully targeted by his friend, 
Danish Kaneira, in a ‘spot-fixing’ scam because he was young, impressionable and easily influenced 
(Wilson, 2014). Prison employee, James Almond, was targeted by an inmate to smuggle mobile 
phones into prison because he was a vulnerable junior employee with only a few months of service 
and had not received any training in dealing with prisoners as his job was solely to escort contractors 
into and out of the prison (Shaw, 2017). Similarly, research participant, Walter, was just one member 
of a local authority planning committee. He was singled out by the property developer and paid to 
influence a planning decision because of past friendship with the corruptor. 
Salesman Phil had spent a whole career bribing customers to win contracts. His approach to 
assessing the risks and opportunities involved building a profile of his targets. He was constantly 
vigilant for submissive pathogen hints and cues: 
‘… the more corrupt people in the UK are Asian.  If I walked into an office, and I was 
introduced to the buyer of a project, and he was Asian, Indian, or Pakistani, the chance 
of him being corrupt were probably better than 50, 50, that he would want something.  
You knew straightaway, because again it’s a culture thing.  They come from a poor 
background, they’re in a position of power, they’re going to profit by it.  The same with 
Eastern European, you would put them at sort of 20 or 30 per cent.  If you saw a 
picture of the wife and kids on the desk, and a crucifix up on the wall, you sort of 
knocked it down to five per cent, unless he’s putting an act on!  If you saw a nice 
picture of a yacht on the desk, which was bigger than he could have bought on a 
salary, he’s sending you a signal to say, talk to me.’ [Phil]  
He was also very particular in avoiding the risks associated with high profile targets:  
‘I was low profile, I dealt with low profile people, I would never do business with 
anyone who was high profile and corrupt, because the chances of getting caught were 
high.  I dealt with people who were as professional as I was at what they did, and I was 
fortunate that I could make a very good living without trawling the pond and getting 
out the dangerous fish.  And there’s plenty of them around.’  [Phil] 
Grooming a target 
The grooming phase of the corruption process, if required at all, involves building rapport and 
pushing the boundaries of a relationship down the ‘slippery slope’ towards the final act (Köbis et al, 
2016). The corruptors manipulate relationships to the point that affective bonds minimise the risks 
of rejection (Free and Murphy, 2015). At the same time they are constantly watching out for the 
target’s weaknesses. The corruption of Walter was the culmination of months of carefully planned 
meetings designed to manipulate the relationship into one of perceived friendship whilst patiently 
waiting for Walter to reveal his vulnerabilities. Eventually Walter provided a necessary piece of the 
jigsaw by mentioning some minor financial difficulties. This was the cue to initiate the final act of 
public bribery: 
‘And he was saying, “I've got a little something for you [a gift]”.  I went, “Well, you 
shouldn't have.”  And he gets this ### bag and he says, “It's just a little something, you 
know, thanks very much.”  I said, “Well, there's nothing to thank me for.” 
And he goes, “Oh, there's a little something else.” He said, “I know money's tight at the 
moment…. “…and he takes the bottle out and he tips - and there's £### there - and he 
said, “There's a little something for you.”  He said, “I know money's tight at the 
moment…” So he lent me…as far as I was concerned, he'd lent me ### quid.  
So I've gone in, sat down and he said, “There's a plan I want to show you.”  And he 
pulls out ####'s house.  Now, the stupid mistake I made was not going, look, I can't 
discuss this at all, right.  As far as I was concerned, here was a friend of mine.’ [Walter] 
In Phil’s view the point of highest risk is when the corrupt offer is made, however ‘crossing the 
Rubicon’ into criminality creates the security of mutual assured destruction. He was astonishingly 
blunt in ensuring co-offenders understood the terms of the arrangement: 
‘At that point, you then…well I, I can only talk for the way I used to work, I used to say, 
“Well you’ve joined an underground army now, we’re both at risk, because in the eyes 
of the law, both the giver and the taker are equally guilty.  You’re as guilty as me.  I’m 
offering the money, you’re taking it, so we’re both guilty.  So, if you like, we are 
partners in this now.”’ [Phil] 
A further relevant grooming example is the ‘spot fixing’ scandal involving Essex cricketer Mervyn 
Westfield. Westfield was paid £6,000 by another cricketer, Danish Kaneria, to deliberately bowl 
badly against Durham in 2009 (Edwards, 2012).  Westfield pleaded guilty to accepting the corrupt 
payment. There was insufficient evidence to prosecute Kaneria, but he was found guilty at a 
subsequent cricket disciplinary panel and banned from the sport for life (ECB v Kaneria, 2013). In this 
case Kaneria can be viewed as the ‘corrupter pathogen’ who recruited Mervyn Westfield, the 
‘submissive pathogen’, a young, impressionable and easily influenced person (ECB v Kaneria, 2013; 
ESPNCRICINFO, 2012; Westfield, 2013). Kaneria had well documented ties with corrupt groups. He 
had built up a relationship with Westfield, who was also a neighbour, before raising the possibility of 
‘spot fixing’. He then maintained pressure on Westfield until he relented. Kaneria used the classical 
‘everybody is at it’ rationalisation and expressed sympathy with the difficulties Westfield faced in 
getting by on the money he earned. Both Kaneira and Westfield exploited the presence of ‘resident 
pathogens’ within the professional cricketing world at the time: the organisational weaknesses 
within the club and the governing body which were inadequate in promoting integrity, failed to 
deter the players and were unable to prevent the corruption. Westfield was eventually exposed by a 
whistleblower, fellow cricketer Tony Palladino, following anti-corruption training by the Professional 
Cricketers’ Association (Hoult, 2012). 
Financial incentives  
Once a person has been identified as potentially corrupt the next stage is the offering of the 
incentive to secure participation. For the participants in this study it was monetary, but there are 
numerous other types of material or service favours which can be offered as alternatives or in 
combination. Nevertheless, making this offer is the significant risk point for the corruptor. 
Participant Phil colourfully described how he approached the crucial ‘balls on the table’ moment: 
‘I have to tell you, “I’m on commission.  If I’m successful in winning this job from you, I 
would get…I’ll probably get about £70,000 in commission, so that’s why it’s important 
that we win it.” ….. And then you can, halfway through lunch, say, “I’m quite happy to 
split that with you.”  And …we used to call it, balls on the table, you know the old knife 
can come down and cut them off, or you can reach across and say, “I’m in.”’  [Phil] 
Coercion 
Coercion may arise when favours or cash bribes are insufficient motivators. It is more likely to be 
within the armoury of sociopathic corruptors, individuals with the capacity for higher risk taking and 
less concern for the consequences to others or, indeed, themselves. Those accustomed to criminal 
lifestyles are likely to fall into this category. James Almond, the prison worker, was approached by an 
inmate convicted of armed robbery who threatened his family whilst offering bribes worth double 
his weekly pay for smuggling the phones into prison (Shaw, 2017). The fear of harm and the cash 
incentives were sufficient motivations to persuade Almond to participate in the crimes. 
Research participant, Carl, was also a prison officer. He was targeted by a criminal network to 
smuggle drugs into prison. Carl declined their first approach and reported the incident to his 
superiors. However, the management’s response was one of indifference. There was no 
investigation, no risk assessment, no monitoring of the situation nor any support in the anticipation 
that they might approach Carl again. Two months later he was having a quiet drink with his father in 
a pub when he was accosted by the same criminals. Faced with the same combination of threat and 
incentive experienced by James Almond, Carl passed through the veil into corruption: 
‘I was having a drink on a Sunday afternoon with my father, went up to the bar for him 
and the same two guys were there again saying, “It’s your dad downstairs isn’t it?” So 
not only are they threatening me, they’re threatening my family now. So I cooperated 
with them give them my phone number and they say, “Okay, when we need stuff we 
call you, you take it and you be there.”’ [Carl] 
The cultural backdrop which makes bribery easier 
In extreme circumstances bribery is a way of life, so deeply embedded in an organisation’s culture 
that any pretence of policies and systems of control are mere window dressing (Brown, Trevino and 
Harrison, 2005). Brian, Harvey and Phil all worked for businesses which relied on bribery and they 
were willing participants. The routine activities and systems in their companies were not just 
infected by pathogens, their failures were so deliberate and advanced that the systems themselves 
had become mature resident pathogens. Indeed Brian illustrated how training can become a 
resident pathogen:  
‘Oh I remember. We used to have training courses in the company … In …this was in 
the 80’s I think, early 90’s. A chap used to come in. A consultant used to come in and 
he would talk about our business. And we used to have role play…he would talk about 
you and our customer over there, and his big thing was you have to know the 
difference between subjective and objective needs of your customer. His objective 
need, yes he wants your product and he has to… you know…His subjective need, he 
has to look after himself and he also has to make himself look good to his boss. And we 
were taught all these things about how to make his subjective needs and obviously this 
included making himself a bit wealthier. You know, this was being taught to us.’ [Brian]  
Siemens was a highly publicised example of a corrupt organisational culture. Prior to its reforms, 
active bribery was Siemens’ business model (US Department of Justice, 2008). The company’s 
accountancy and control systems were structured resident pathogens that supported and carefully 
accounted for the corporate bribery using the bland euphemism, ‘nützliche Aufwendungen’ (useful 
expenditure) (Schubert and Miller, 2008). Ashforth and Annand (2003) portray such businesses as 
institutionally corrupt; they normalise bribery and, in accordance with the learning pathway of 
differential association (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill, 1992, p88), socialise recruits into the 
organisation’s nefarious practices (Ditton, 1977). Emerging awareness of the normalising resident 
pathogens inherent in an organisation’s training, administrative practices, selling and procurement 
methods thus presents new employees with three strategic choices: leave, turn a blind eye, or 
construct ‘denying the guilty mind’ rationalisations (Benson, 1985) and join the community of 
pathogens, Phil’s underground army. 
Rationalisation 
Rationalisation is a psychological process which enables otherwise moral people to neutralise the 
cognitive dissonance stimulated by moral tensions when they engage in immoral conduct (Benson, 
1985; Goldstraw-White, 2012; Sykes and Matza, 1957). Neutralising verbalisations appeared in the 
accounts of all the interviewees. Interestingly, there was a clear division between the types of 
rationalisations used. The three businessmen, Brian, Harvey and Phil, all excused their conduct as 
normal, what everybody has to do in business (Benson, 1985). On the other hand, the three bribees 
in public office attached fault to specific persons. Walter felt he had been solicited unwittingly by his 
corruptor friend into the bribe which he regarded as a loan, the classic borrowing rationalisation 
(Cressey, 1953). Carole and Carl both claimed coercion was the cause of their downfalls, a type of 
rationalisation identified by Daly (1989). Carl also blamed his managers who were indifferent to his 
plight, a condemnation of his condemners (Benson, 1985). 
Sutherland advised, rationalisations can be learned from associates within sub-cultures (Sutherland, 
Cressey and Luckenbill, 1992, p88). Thus, where rationalisations are tolerated, communally 
expressed and embedded in organisational cultures, they can become powerful system pathogens 
which promote frequent, widespread criminality (Shepherd and Button, 2018). The ‘normal’ 
rationalisations expressed by the three corruptors reflect views that bribery is an everyday feature 
of their respective organisations and marketplaces. Phil, the international businessman, was 
forthright that bribery is a necessary component of commerce in some countries: 
‘My own view was always….if you don’t like it, don’t go there.  But if you do like it, and 
you want to go there, and you need the business, then keep your mouth shut and play 
by the rules.….And we might find their laws archaic and whatever, but they are the 
laws.  And if it’s perceived as the way to do business, well then you must be prepared 
to do it.’ [Phil] 
Harvey, a property developer, cited the activities of a very senior local politician to illustrate his 
rationalisations that corruption is normal, widespread and the only way to do business: 
‘I know a man who used to deliver an envelope to him monthly in cash to his house, so 
don’t start kidding me…’ [Harvey] 
 
Implications for prevention  
The bookshelves bend under the weight of the numerous practitioner texts and guides which 
provide helpful anti-corruption advice (for example, Giles, 2012; Wegner et al, 2013). There is also a 
certifiable international standard, BS ISO 37001: 2016 Anti-Bribery Management System, which 
organisations can implement to demonstrate compliance with the Bribery Act 2010. Many of these 
publications address both fraud and bribery because the two crimes share common characteristics 
including abuse of position, breach of trust, secrecy, environmental opportunities, motivations, 
rationalisations and methods (Brytting, Minogue and Morino, 2011, pxxii). However, there is very 
little evidence of the effectiveness of these methods (Hafner et al, 2016, p23), possibly because they 
are dominated by management tools designed for routine financial control and asset protection 
(Gordon and Miyake, 2000). More recently, a number of scholars have advocated the utility of 
situational crime prevention (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) in the analysis of corruption because, in 
contrast to more generalised theories and approaches, it pays attention to the specific 
circumstances and scripts of situations (Graycar and Prenzler, 2013; Tunley et al, 2017). 
This paper has illustrated that the necessary ingredients for bribery to occur in these situations is the 
convergence of human and resident pathogens. The pathogen network analysis illustrated in Figure 
2 is a visualisation tool for examining the relationships between these pathogens in actual or 
potential corrupt situations. It assists retrospective learning from actual events by mapping the 
connections between the human pathogens, who decided on a corrupt course of action, and the 
resident system pathogens which enabled the act. It also enables managers to prioritise the 
implementation of remedies by visually locating and ranking the pathogen risks. 
The corruption pathogen model suggests that organisations should endeavour to avoid human 
pathogens in the first place, especially the assertive corruptor pathogens who pose the greatest 
threat, using due diligence and recruitment screening methods. Organisations should also tease out 
resident pathogens within their cultures and control systems to bolster their defences against 
emerging or cemented corrupt relationships. Walter’s and Carl’s stories illustrate the importance of 
disrupting the grooming processes which may lead to powerful social bonds, coercion or blackmail. 
Sometimes avoiding predatory corruptor pathogens can be deceptively straightforward, simply 
requiring that so-called ‘red flags’ are not ignored (Shaw and Fischer, 2005; Button and Gee, 2013, 
p42, 91). Walter’s council, for example, ought to train its councillors, especially those on the 
planning committee, to recognise and report bribery signals that preface the slippery slope of 
corruption. Carl’s prison needs to train its managers to heed corruption warnings and develop robust 
response plans with appropriate security measures that support targeted members of staff. 
By applying the pathogen network prospectively, corruption risks can be anticipated and controlled. 
Networks centred on each job role illuminate the associated pathogen risks and promote challenging 
reflections on the trajectory of corruption opportunities. Reflecting Phil’s case, are the sales 
incentives so large that the sales manager can afford to assertively bribe customers using his own 
money? How would the procurement processes resist exploitation by a corruptor, like Brian, and a 
financially distressed engineering manager? Are the regulators, such as Walter, trained to spot 
grooming techniques? Should the organisation even deal with organisations encumbered by a 
corrupt track record like Siemens? Are the existing due diligence and recruitment screening 
processes adequate for all situations? 
Not every role in an organisation is susceptible to corruption risks. Nevertheless, the risks are not 
confined to senior roles or the more obvious positions have authority over monetary or regulatory 
transactions. Carl and Carole were junior prison officers and James Almond had a support role, 
escorting contractors into prisons (Shaw, 2017). Li attempted to bribe his professor (BBC, 2013) and 
the first person convicted under the Bribery Act 2010 was a clerk whose role involved entering 
information onto a court database (BBC, 2011). The pathogen network approach can be used to 
highlight which roles and relationships should be prioritised for in depth initial due diligence or 
recruitment screening, continuous monitoring or tightened controls (Button and Gee, 2013, p59; 
Risk Advisory Group, 2017). A complete analysis for each role and relationship includes all five 
dimensions set out in this paper: the four human dimensions covering the corruptor pathogen, the 
submissive pathogen (or second corruptor), the briber and the bribe, and the resident pathogens 
within the organisation’s control systems. 
A positive aspect that can be drawn from all the cases introduced in this paper is that they were all 
exposed following complaints. The Westfield case is particularly notable because the investigations 
were triggered by a whistleblowing report from a colleague following anti-corruption training by the 
Professional Cricketers’ Association (PCA). This incident highlights how training and support is 
necessary to make whistleblowing systems effective. A key element of this training is tackling the 
rationalisations which open the psychological pathway to corruption (Cressey, 1953). Following 
Shepherd and Button (2018), rationalisations become infectious resident pathogens when they are 
tolerated and embedded within an organisation’s culture. Dismantling these rationalisations serves 
two purposes based in developing positive normative values. Firstly, it helps to deter some people 
who may contemplate engaging in corruption (Nettler, 1974, Cressey, 1986). All of the research 
participants verbalised rationalisations for their criminality in terms of borrowing, coercion or 
normality (Table 1). It is not known what impact such training would have had on the six 
participants. However, it is reasonable to argue that dismantling rationalisations is likely to affect 
submissive pathogens more positively than assertive corruptors. This hypothesis is worthy of further 
research. The second purpose, as illustrated by the PCA training, is that dismantling rationalisations 
encourages whistleblowing by informing colleagues that there is no legitimate excuse for corruption. 
 Conclusions 
This paper has examined the social interactions and settings involved in the perpetration of a small 
sample of bribery cases using a novel approach, the metaphor of pathogens. The paper has 
demonstrated how corruptor pathogens recruit other human pathogens using profiling, grooming, 
financial incentives and coercion. The key theoretical proposition is that the situational pathway to 
the act of bribery must involve the convergence of at least three pathogens and at least two types. 
There must be at least two human pathogens: a human ‘corruptor pathogen’ who offers or seeks a 
bribe and a corresponding, sufficiently motivated ‘submissive pathogen’ (or a second corruptor 
pathogen). There must also be at least one ‘resident pathogen’ or weakness within the 
organisation’s culture or control systems. The pathogen network model visually represents these 
pathogens as connected nodes. 
The pathogen model is a simple tool for both researchers and practitioners. It sets out a framework 
for positivist research into the aetiology of bribery and other workplace crimes. It can also be linked 
into existing crime theories such as situational crime prevention (Cornish and Clark, 2003) and 
rationalisation theory (Cressey, 1953). Behaviourists can deploy it to investigate how social learning 
and conditioning draws otherwise moral persons into corrupt corporate practices (Ashforth and 
Annand, 2003). It provides practitioners and corporate managers with a tool to bolster 
organisational resilience, particularly when used in conjunction with existing risk assessment and 
prevention practices (Button and Gee, 2013). It has the capacity to support organisations in both 
prospective crime risk analyses and retrospective causal diagnoses. The key to preventing bribery is 
preventing corruptor pathogens from being employed in or working with an organisation in the first 
place; and then creating a resilient management environment with few resident pathogens and 
submissive pathogens that can be exploited by any remaining corruptor pathogens. 
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Table 1: Interview participants 
Pseudonym Gender Age Script Bribery type Classification 
Primary 
rationalisation 
Walter  M 40-59 
Councillor - took bribes for 
planning permits 
Public bribery 
Submissive bribee - 
submissive pathogen  
Borrowing 
Carl  M 20-39 
Prison officer - coerced and 
took bribes for smuggling 
drugs into prison 
Public bribery 
Submissive bribee - 
submissive pathogen 
Coercion 
Carole F 40-59 
Prison officer - coerced and 
offered bribes 
Public bribery 
Submissive bribee - 
submissive pathogen 
Coercion 
Harvey M 60+ 
Property developer - paid 
bribes for projects   
Public bribery, 
commercial bribery 
Assertive briber - 
corruptor pathogen 
Normal 
Phil  M 60+ 
International salesman - 
paid bribes for supply 
contracts 
Public bribery, 
commercial bribery 
Assertive briber - 
corruptor pathogen 
Normal 
Brian M 60+ 
Company director – 
authorised bribes for supply 
contracts 
Commercial bribery 
Assertive briber - 
corruptor pathogen 
Normal 
 
Figure 1: Simple pathogen network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(S) Submissive pathogen (C) Corruptor pathogen 
(R) Resident pathogen(s) 
Organisation 
  
 
Figure 2: Pathogen network centred on ‘Carl’ 
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